The Impacts of MERCOSUR on Brazil by Brandao, Antonio Salazar P. et al.
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION  IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Edited by Constanza Valdes and Terry Roe
April 1997
PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM  SPONSORED  BY THE
INTERNATIONAL  AGRICULTURAL TRADE RESEARCH CONSORTIUM
AND THE INTER-AMERICAN  INSTITUTE  FOR COOPERATION ON AGRICULTURE
JUNE 7-9, 1995  SAN JOSE, COSTA RICASESSION 6A.  STRUCTURAL  MODELS  OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRADE
The Impacts of MERCOSUR on Brazil
Antonio Salazar Branddo,  Mauro de Rezende  Lopes  and Lia Valls  Pereira,
Fundaci6n Getulio  Vargas,  Brazil
Introduction
In March  1991,  Argentina,  Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Treaty of Asuncion  aiming to create
a common market (MERCOSUR) by January  1, 1995.  The common  market comprises  a region where  in
1993,  population was  almost 200 million people,  GDP was about US$  650 billion and per capita  income
was US$  3,400. Exports  and imports were,  respectively,  US$ 52.5 billion and US$ 43.5  billion Improved
diplomatic relations between Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s,  albeit  the domestic probings faced by both
economies  during that decade,  were an important  first step for the  creation of MERCOSUR.  Being the
largest partners of the block, the path towards integration started with them and successful  completion of
the  process  depends  fundamentally  on  the  commitment  demonstrated  by  the  two  countries  with  the
completion  of  the  negotiations  and  how  they  will  follow  the  rules  and  disciplines  imposed  by  the
agreement.  The  strength with  which  these  will be pursued  will  depend  heavily  on how the  domestic
economics  evolve,  in relation to macroeconomic  stability,  and on the actual  impacts  of the agreement.
Gainers from integration will support a faster pace while losers will  struggle for a slow down.
There  have  been  few  serious  attempts  to  measure  the  impacts  of the  common  market  on these  two
economies.  The task is difficult because  of the net of intersectoral  effects  that involve both factor  and
product markets  and of the  large size of two tariff changes  that will have  taken  place  at the  end of the
adjustment period.  Nevertheless,  this task is overdue.  In this paper  we make an attempt to estimate  some
of these  impacts  using  a computable  general  equilibrium  model (CGE)  called  General  Trade  Analysis
Package (GTAP) 1.
The  paper  is organized  as follows.  In the next section a brief accounting  of the negotiations  that  led to
MERCOSUR  is presented,  together with some basic quantitative data and with a discussion of the future
prospects  for the integration.  In section 3 an stylized description of the Brazilian and Argentine economics
is presented.  Section 4 contains  a summary of GTAP for the reader unfamiliar with the model.  Section 5
discusses  the main results  and section 6 concludes  the paper.
MERCOSUR
Table  1 shows  some macroeconomic  indicators for MERCOSUR  as  a whole.  Exports have  increased  18
percent  between  1991  and  1993  and  imports  have  increased  42  percent  over  the  same  period.  The
remarkable  growth of them is a consequence  of structural  reforms made by the economies  of the region,
particularly Argentina and Brazil,  and of the renewal of growth process.2  But it has also been facilitated
1  GTAP has been developed by Herter (1993)  and associates at Purdue University.
2  During the period  1990/1993  the growth rate for the MERCOSUR countries was  11 percent.
151by  large  amounts of foreign  capital  inflows  that occurred  over  the period,  which allowed  international
reserves  to increase  almost three times.
Table  1:  MERCOSUR  - Main macroeconomic  indicators
Itemization  1990  1991  1992  1993
Gross  Domestic Product (GDP)
Current Value (US$ Millions)  586,974  600,574  605,844  652,229
Population (millions of persons)  189  192  195  196
Per Capita Income  (US$)  2,943  3,105  3,201  3,435
Trade Balance (US$ Millions)  19,547  14,510  12,692  9,468
Exports (US$ Millions)  FOB  46,837  46,319  50,734  54,704
Imports  (US$ Millions)  FOB  (27,290)  (31,809)  (35,042)  (45,236)
Current Account Balance  (US$ Millions)  762  (2,503)  (1,602)  (9,196)
International  Reserves  (US$ Millions)  (*)  13,797  16,380  34,434  46,518
Exports/GDP  (%)  8.43  7.78  8.13  8.05
Imports/GDP  (%)  4.91  5.34  6.10  6.66
(Imports+Exports)  / GDP (%)  13.35  13.12  14.23  14.71
Debt service/International  reserves  (%)  118.15  94.20  46.31  45.08
Source: Banco Central do Brazil - MERCOSUR - Informacoes selecionadas.
Despite the significant efforts of Argentina  and Brazil to open their economies,  this regional block is still
comprised of fairly closed economies.  In 1993 the share of trade in GDP (that is,  imports plus exports)  is
still around  14 percent.
The Path Towards MERCOSUR
Regional integration is not a new phenomenon in Latin America.
In 1960, it was created the Latin America Free Trade Association  (LAFTA) aiming to create  a free trade
zone in a period of 12 years3. The main driving force of LAFTA was the idea that the integration process
could foster the import substitution model of industrialization by obtaining greater  economies  of scale due
to  the enlargement of the market size  (Valls Pereira  1993).
Many factors have contributed to the failure of LAFTA. The dismantling of tariffs through the application
of the principle  of most favored nation between countries  with very  deep differences  in their productive
structures  and levels of development  led to systematic demands for waivers and special treatment by many
governments.  Very strict stated periods,  often not observed,  to accomplish the targets negotiated  did not
also help to build confidence  on the process of integration.  Most important of all, the idea of integration
through liberalization was  contradictory  to the logic behind the import substitution model. Governments
were accustomed  to think about protection  as a means to stimulate growth and,  therefore, very reluctant
to offer extensive list of goods to be subject to a free-trade  status.
3 The country - member of LAFTA were Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil, Chile,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Mexico,
Paraguay,  Peru,  Uruguay and Venezuela.
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13.7%  in  1981.  Part  of this  result  can be  explained  by  favorable  conditions  of growth  in many  Latin
American countries coupled with the implementation of diverse incentives to manufactured exports,  besides
some preferential tariff agreements  due to LAFTA.
In 1980,  LAFTA  was extinguished  and in its place the Treaty of Montevideo  created the Latin America
Integration  Association  (LAIA).  The  principles  that  guided  LAIA  were  very  different  from  those  of
LAFTA.  The  concept that  the  ultimate  goal  was  the creation  of  a  Latin America  free  trade  zone  was
preserved.  Notwithstanding,  no rigid periods with targets to be fulfilled and neither  automatic  instruments
to  advance  the  process  of integration  were  contemplated.  The  aim was  to  stimulate  tariff preferential
agreements between the member-countries  who wanted to do so.
In this same period,  Argentina and Brazil began to improve their diplomatic  relationships  characterized  by
disputes  around border  questions.  This  was reflected on the signature  of an agreement  about  the use of
hydric resources,  which was the main contention between these countries during  the seventies.
Better diplomatic  relationships were not, however,  immediately translated into  any improvements towards
economic  integration.  The  debt crisis of 1982  was  answered  in many  countries by  the introduction  of
different  protective  measures  and high currency  devaluations,  as  in the  case  of Brazil.  This  was not a
propitious  scenario to integration.
The middle of the eighties marks the beginning  of the return to democracy  in both countries, facilitating
even more the strengthening  of the relationships between Argentina  and Brazil.  In 1986, this strengthening
was sealed with the signature of PICE (Program for Integration and Economic  Cooperation).  It must be
pointed  out that  this Program  was an  initiative of the Argentine  and Brazilian  Executives  and was  not
preceded by any demand of entrepreneur  sectors in both countries and neither by a reversal of the decline
of intra-regional  trade. The percentage  of intra-exports  within the MERCOSUR  declines from  11.6%  in
1980 to  5.5% in  1985  and only achieve values  compared to  1980 after  1990 (see table 2).
The PICE was an agreement based upon 24 sectoral negotiations  that covers trade in areas  such as  capital
goods,  wheat,  automotive  industry  and  contemplates  cooperation  in  technological  policies  and  energy
supply,  for example.
The  conception  of PICE  can be  interpreted  in two  ways.  On the  one  hand,  reflects  the  emphasis  still
presented at that moment  with the  consolidation  of the industrialization process4. On the  other hand, the
sectoral  agreements  establishing  targets of equilibrium  on trade  was  a means  to  weaken  the distrust  of
entrepreneur  sectors in both countries in respect to the process of integration.
After just two years that PICE was  signed  and with mostly of the agreements  still reflecting  a  "letter of
intentions",  Argentina  and Brazil  signed a new treaty aiming  to create  a common market.  The perception
that the world was driving towards an organization  based upon regional agreements,  that Latin American
countries were outside the interests of economic integration by developed countries,  possible failure of the
Uruguay Round and a move towards liberalization by Argentina and Brazil are some of the main factors
that could explain this new treaty.
4  It was not a casual decision the emphasis given to the capital  goods sector on PICE (Lavagna  1991).
153Table  2:  Intra-Trade  in Relationship to Total  Exports
In  US$ millions
Years  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
LAIA
Share of Intra-  13.8  14.3  12.3  8.5  8.9  8.0  11.0  10.7  10.6  11.0  10.9  13.6  18.8  19.2
LAIA  Exports
Growth  of  8.9  -18.2  -28.4  16.6  -12.9  11.3  8.2  14.1  14.3  10.2  22.3  29.0  21.8
exports  to LAIA
Growth  of total  5.2  -5.3  3.6  11.6  -2.5  -19.4  10.9  15.3  10.8  10.6  -1.6  4.4  6.4
exports
Andean Group
Share of Intra-  4.0  4.9  4.8  3.3  2.9  2.6  3.4  5.1  4.7  4.1  4.2  6.0  8.0  9.7
Andean  Group
Exports
Growth  of  5.9  -7.3  -36.2  -3.5  -5.4  -8.9  65.5  -8.5  5.9  33.0  33.9  26.1  28.8
exports to
Andean  Groups
Growth of total  -13.5  -2.5  -10.7  10.8  3.8  -29.5  10.5  -2.0  22.5  30.5  -7.2  -4.7  5.7
exports
MERCOSUR
Share of Intra-  11.6  8.9  8.1  5.9  6.3  5.5  8.6  7.4  6.6  8.2  8.9  11.1  14.3  18.5
MERCOSUR
Exports
Growth of  -11.6  -22.2  -22.0  25.4  -15.1  34.3  -3.6  16.4  30.4  7.6  23.6  41.4  38.9
exports to
MERCOSUR
Growth of total  15.0  -14.1  6.5  17.2  -3.2  -13.2  11.7  31.5  3.7  -0.3  -1.1  10.0  7.3
exports
Source:  CEPAL
Soon  after  the  treaty  of  1988  was  signed,  the  Argentine  and  Brazilian  governments  decided  that  the
common market was due to being in 1995.  Finally,  the Treaty of Asunci6n creating the MERCOSUR  was
sealed establishing  a common market between  Argentina, Brazil,  Paraguay  and  Uruguay.5
The Treaty of Asunci6n: What was Accomplished?
The Treaty of Asunci6n has to be interpreted  as a legal  device to establish negotiations  in order to achieve
a common market between the member countries  of MERCOSUR.  It does not establish  any supranational
institution  that  represents  the  interests  of the  community  neither  specifies  how  negotiations  must  be
implemented.
s Paraguay and Uruguay are very  small economies  in relation to Argentina and Brazil.  Their trade is relatively
more  dependent upon their big neighbors.  In 1991,  35.2%  of Paraguay and Uruguay exports,  respectively,  were
directed to MERCOSUR.  The same  figures for Argentina and Brazil were  4 percent and 16.1  percent
respectively.
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in ten fields6. Nonetheless,  the Treaty has established a calendar determining  the move towards  zero tariffs
between the  member countries until January  1995.  This move was  to be accomplished  by an automatic
linear reduction of tariffs, although the countries could present list of exceptions that would have  also to
diminish their scope over the period (1991-1995).
It is not the aim of this article  to enumerate the results  obtained in all  group  of negotiations  selected  to
establish  a common market.  Even though  it can be stated that clear  advances were  only achieved  in the
establishment of a free trade area and the implementation of a external  common tariff. In this sense,  since
January  1995,  Argentina,  Brazil,  Paraguay and Uruguay can be labeled as  an  "imperfect custom union".
Why  "an imperfect custom union"?
Brazil  has promoted  a Tariff Reform in  1990 that reduced  the average tariff from 32%  to  14%  in three
years.  The modal tariff of the Reform was 20%  and the rates ranged  between 0% and 40%.  Most of the
manufactured products,  including  capital goods, were under the 20% import tariffs. Import tariffs of 30%
fell upon some chemical  products, wheat,  some food products  and some durable  consumers  such as  TV
and video-recorders.  Import tariffs of 35 % covered automobiles,  trucks and motorbikes  and 40%  fell upon
computer and some telecommunication  goods.
Argentina began its most recent liberalization process at the end of the eighties.  In 1991,  the import tariffs
were  11%  for raw materials  and intermediary  products,  zero percent  for any  items  not manufactured  in
the  country and  22%  for finished products  (Three levels).  At the end of  1991,  the maximum tariff was
raised to 35 % but covering  only  15 products,  and the average tariff dropped from  18.15%  to 11.77%.  In
October  1992, the statistical tax that fell upon imports went up to  10%  as a temporary measure to deal with
the sharp increase on the trade deficit'.  Besides, imports of automobiles  and few other products  are subject
to import license.
The negotiations about the external common tariff of MERCOSUR  proved to be difficult in some areas.
Brazil opposed  relatively less resistance to lower common external tariffs.  Although Argentina recognized
the threat that relatively lower tariffs on commodities such as wheat, maize, dry milk, and rice would allow
imports of subsidized products from  European Union and the United States,  which  would damage  their
interests  in the booming Brazilian markets,  the Argentine  negotiations minimized  this preoccupation.  In
part this was a matter of strategy:  if Argentina  had claimed that agricultural  commodities would  have to
have higher common external tariffs, this would justify Brazilian negotiations  to push for higher tariffs on
industrial  and  related goods.
The final  agreement of common external  tariffs  was reached in terms of a range  from 6 to  12%,  tariffs
considered  relatively  low by all standards,  considering commodities subject  to severe price distortion,  due
to subsidies in world markets and protective  domestic policies either in developed countries  and developing
6  Latter  a new group of negotiations was introduced due to demands of the unions.  Appendix  1 lists the
negotiation groups.
7  The statistic  as is collected as a mechanism  to finance the  statistical services related to trade  and it is not a trade
instrument,  according to Argentine government.
155countries.  These tariffs would characterize  a so-called  "open bloc", with less potential for trade diversion.
In agriculture, MERCOSUR  would protect relatively less the member countries.
However,  a few issues appeared in the process of discussion of the common external tariffs. One critical
issue  was related to the lack of a supporting regulation for the case of unfair trade competition.  Another
regulation  deemed  necessary  was  the  MERCOSUR  legislation  on safeguards,  for  agroindustrial  and
industrial products  as well.  This needed legislation  has been discussed  among the member countries.
In relationship  to  the  industrial  sectors,  the  import  tariff structures  of both countries  reveal  different
productive environments  and, therefore, different strategies which have reflected on the negotiation about
the external common tariff.
Argentina,  for example,  have zero import tariffs for capital and computer  goods.  In the case of computer
this is a consequence of Argentina not being a producer.  In relation to capital goods,  its share on the value
added by industry has dropped from 23.1%  to 17.7% between  1985  and  1990  (Kume e Markwald  1993).
The  strategy  after the  1990's  was  then to  eliminate  import  tariffs  and  to  protect the  industry  giving  a
subsidy  of 15%  to domestic production.  Imports of capital goods at international prices  are interpreted  as
a means to accelerate the process of modernization  of all industries.
Brazil as the only producer of computer goods and the largest producer of capital goods in MERCOSUR
rouse fears of trade diversion on the other member  countries.  At the  same time these  are sectors  with a
history  of high protection  in the  Brazilian  economy.  And  despite  of this,  in  some  branches  of these
industries Brazil has displayed  a good performance  in the international  market.  Consequently,  the  capital
and computer goods entrepreneur  sectors were not prepared to accept a regime of free trade in relationship
to the rest of the world. Tariffs are justified on the grounds that Brazil has a relatively  large and diversified
capital goods sector with some degree of efficiency  and the cost of a zero tariff will be very high.
The solution was to offer a period of transition for these industries  until the external common tariff could
be implemented.  In the case of capital goods it was agreed that an average  tariff of 14%  to be in force  in
2001  and for computer  and some telecommunications  goods an average tariff of 16%  to be  in force  in
2006.  During the period of transition the tariffs of the member countries will be converging to the agreed
tariff.
There are also national list of exceptions in relationship to the common external tariff and to the free trade
zone between member-countries8. It is expected that the process of convergence towards  the custom union
tariff and the  free trade zone  will be completed  in 2000 for these products.  So,  at the present  stage the
external  common tariff covers  83 % of the tariff items.  It was also agreed rules of origin for the products
not  subject  to  the common  external  tariff - regional  requirements  of 60%  for  all  products,  with  the
exception of capital goods whose rate is  80%.
MERCOSUR,  therefore,  will be only a truly custom union by 2006
8  At January  1995,  the national list of exceptions of Argentina in relationship to the external  common tariff has
232 items,  mostly from steel, chemical,  paper and shoe industries.  The Brazilian list has 175 items from
chemical,  petroleum, textile raw materials,  rubber,  agricultural products.  Paraguay has 210  and Uruguay 212
items on their list.
156With  respect  to  the other  negotiations  to  create  a common market,  the  results  are  less clear  as  it  was
already  pointed  out.  Efforts  to  harmonize  technical  barriers,  rules  to  organize  the  different  types  of
transportation,  rules  to  integrate  the  financial  markets  are  all  in  discussion  with  different  degrees  of
success.  The most visible result of the negotiations until now is undoubtedly the trade aspects.
Part of the difficulties  to  negotiate  derives  from the  relatively  short period  proposed  by  the  Treaty  of
Asunci6n to create  a common market (4 years).  This was  in some  sense  expected  by governments  and
private sectors and is not seen as a sign of total impossibility to create  a common market.
Other  problems  derive  from  specific  circumstances  that  surround  the  stabilization  plans,  specially  in
Argentina  and Brazil. For instance, Brazil has not yet realized the Fiscal Reform which is  important not
only from the point of view of the stabilization plan, but also from the point of view of abolishing a highly
distorted tax structure in terms of economic efficiency.  In this sense any discussion about tax harmonization
turns to be very vague whereas  the Brazilian Government  does not decide  its tax structure.
Negotiations  about the best exchange-rate  regime in the process  of integration of MERCOSUR  are also
highly complicated when the bigger partners pursue different policies due to their stabilization programs.
Argentina's  centerpiece of its program is  a fixed parity  one to one between  its currency  and  the dollar.
Brazil implements  a system of fixed exchange bands, though the range of the bands can be altered.  The
possibility  of understandings  about exchange-rate  regimes will probably  only be feasible  when the fears
of a return of high inflation rates have vanished  and the two countries  can work together an exchange rate
policy.
Main Results of MERCOSUR  from a Brazilian perspective
Total trade between Brazil and MERCOSUR reached the amount of US$  10579.9 millions in 1994,  which
represents  14%  of Brazilian total trade (See Table  3). In 1980,  when total trade achieved its peak value of
the seventies  that figure was only 7%.  It must be pointed out also that in 1989 the total trade  surpassed the
peak value of 1980, but the percentage in relationship to Brazil total trade was the same of 1980. Therefore
the result for 1994 indeed represents  a change in the structure of Brazilian external trade.  Some additional
data confirms this result.
MERCOSUR's share in Brazil total exports increased from 7.3% to  13.6% between  1992 and  1994.  This
huge  increase  transformed  LAIA  into  the  second  main  market  destination  of Brazilian  exports,  just
surpassed  by the European Union (See  Table 4). Also this means that Argentina is  now the second main
trade partner of Brazil,  after the United  States 9.
9  Whereas the  United States  explains around 20%  of Brazilian total foreign sales,  Argentina's  share is 9.5% in
1994.  Given the great differences in the market sizes of these countries,  the figure for Argentina is significant.
157Table  3:  Brazil  - MERCOSUR:  Total of Trade
US$ millions
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Source:  BACEN - Brazil
Table 4:  Brazil Exports by Market Destination  1991  and  1994
Source:  Balance  Comercial  -DTIC- Brazil.
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Markets  Share  % 1994  Share %  1991  Average  Annual  Growth  94/91
LAIA  22.37  15.55  25.60
MERCOSUR  13.59  7.28  36.99
LAIA -MS  8.78  8.27  13.50
United States  20.24  19.58  12.49
European Union  27.12  30.89  6.52
Asia  16.21  18.01  7.40
Africa  3.10  3.27  9.23
Others  10.96  12.89  5.95
Total  100.00  100.00  11.25The  importance  of Argentina  on the  trade  flows  of Brazil  in  MERCOSUR  is  described  on  Table  5.
Brazilian exports  to Argentina  account roughly for 70%  of the total sales  of Brazil to the regional  bloc.
Moreover,  the rate of increase  of these sales compared to the two other member-countries  is  much higher.
The average annual growth  of Brazilian exports to Paraguay and Uruguay between  1991/1994  was 28.5%
and 29.5%  respectively,  whereas for Argentina  this rate  reaches 41%.
Table 5:  Brazilian  Exports to MERCOSUR
Countries  Average  growth  Share
1989/1991  1991/1994  1994
Argentina  44.15  40.98  69.85
Paraguay  24.32  28.54  17.79
Uruguay  0.52  29.50  12.36
Total MERCOSUR  30.07  36.87  100.00
Source:  BACEN - Brazil.
These figures show that for the Brazilian economy the dynamism of MERCOSUR  is highly dependent upon
the  Argentine  market.  Therefore  the  majority  of the  effects  of the  custom unions  upon  the  Brazilian
agricultural  and industrial sectors will  certainly arise from Brazil-Argentina  trade.
The  good performance  of Brazil  exports  to  MERCOSUR  was  translated  into  the  accumulation  of big
surplus with the other member-countries  (See Table 6).  With Argentina,  the trade balance which was  on
a deficit situation between  1989 and 1991,  reached a surplus of US$  1030 millions  in 1993,  then declined
to US$ 523  millions in  1994.
Table 6:  Trade  Balance Brazil - MERCOSUR
Countries  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
Argentina  (528.60)  (767.28)  (138.51)  1,318.56  1,030.03  523.54
Paraguay  (37.83)  50.80  276.52  355.92  688.22  688.04
Uruguay  (262.46)  (290.02)  (97.03)  173.40  348.88  51.49
MERCOSUR  (829.89)  (1,006.50)  40.98  1,847.88  2,067.13  1,263.07
Source:  BACEN - Brazil
Is the program of tariff reduction initiate in  1991 the sole explanation for these results? If this were true,
Brazil products display high levels of competitiveness in the MERCOSUR markets.  The past trade deficits,
specially with Argentina, would be due to the structure of import barriers. Moreover,  it would be expected
important movements  of trade diversion, since MERCOSUR  as a whole accounted just for 12.7%  of total
imports of Argentina in 1991,  United States for 28.2% and European Union for 29%.  In  1993, just Brazil
159explained  21%  of total Argentine imports, whereas the share of United States and European Union dropped
respectively  to 23 % and 25 %.
Actually two main other factors  explain the Brazilian performance,  besides the stimulus given by the tariff
reductions.  Whereas  the Brazilian  economy was  experiencing a recessive period in the beginning  of the
nineties,  the Argentine economy was booming".  Moreover,  the fixed-exchange  rate associated  with the
stabilization plan in Argentina led to an expressive  overvaluation of the peso  in relationship to the Brazilian
currency (real).  The index of the real exchange  rate between real/peso  reached  15561  on December  1993,
taking as period basis March  199111.
The decline  of trade surplus  in 1994 was due to the recovery  of economic growth in Brazil, the decline of
the overvaluation  associated  with  the stabilization  plan in Brazil and  measures  adopted  to diminish  the
disequilibrium  on the trade balancel2.
Consequently the effects of the creation of a free trade zone during  1991/1994  was largely  influenced by
those  macroeconomic  factors.  And in  this  sense  an  exercise  that  ignores  those  factors just to  give  an
approach of possible impacts of the custom union may help to  evaluate the significance of MERCOSUR
to its member-countries.
Another point  to be  noticed  is  the  composition  of trade between  Argentina  and  Brazil.  Manufactured
exports  respond  roughly  for 55%  of Brazilian total  exports  and  26%  of Argentine  total  foreign  sales.
Observing  the share of manufactures  on the bilateral  trade, the share  of Brazil  increases  to 80%  and  of
Argentine  exports of manufactures  to Brazil goes up to 40%.  In this sense,  MERCOSUR represents  an
important market for manufactures  on both countries1 3.
At a more desegregated  level it can be observed on Table  7 that except for coffee  and iron ore,  the ten
main Brazilian exports to Argentina,  representing  64%  of the total exports  to this market,  is composed of
manufactured  goods.
10  See Section three.
1' See Appendix 4.
12  This includes agreements  in respect to the purchase of Argentine furs and wheat.  Imposition  of safeguard
clauses by Argentina on some Brazilian exports  such as paper and paperboard.
13 See Appendix  4.
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Products  Share  % 1994  Growth % 94/93
Parts,  Tractors,  Motor Vehicles  9.37  10.26
Passenger Cars  5.96  -13.55
Goods Vehicles  4.74  70.56
Piston engines and parts,  nes  3.61  13.17
Iron ore  mining  2.28  -1.35
Flat-rolled plated iron or steel  2.25  -17.53
Semi-finish iron or steel  2.08  86.23
Manufacture  of chemical products  n.e.c.  1.95  10.92
Coffee, not roasted  1.64  81.31
Pumps and compressors  1.58  -4.99
Other products  64.55  13.99
Total Argentina  100.00  13.04
Source:  Balanca Comercial -DTIC - Brazil.
The analysis  of the ten main products exported from Argentina to Brazil, which represents  55.2% of total
exports,  shows  a  high  concentration  on  two  products:  fuels  and  wheat  (29.6%  of  total  exports).
Nonetheless,  sales  of transport  equipment  have  also  a  relatively  significant  weight  in  the  structure  of
foreign  sales to Brazil  12.9%  (See Table 8)14
Table 8: Main Argentine Exports to Brazil, January - October of 1993 and  1994
Products  Share  % 1994  Growth  % 94/93
Oil  15.49  45.42
Wheat  14.13  -11.42
Gearbox  6.20  23.28
Vehicles  4.54  -8.00
Corn  4.03  -12.08
Gross cotton  2.78  600.68
Other leather and skins  2.23  -4.88
Piston Engines  and parts, nes  2.20  -23.09
Soya oil  2.11  115.20
Frozen  fishes  1.63  37.46
Other products  44.65  15.77
Total  100  14.29
Source:  INDEC - Argentina.
14  The automotive sector is subject to an agreement  that establishes  import quotas under zero import tariffs.  The
sector will only be under total free trade in 2000.
161Despite  the relative  asymmetry between  the composition  of trade  between Argentina  and  Brazil,  intra-
industry measures show that the two countries have important linkages  within the manufactured  sector (See
Table 9.  Considering yet that intra-industrial  trade is one of the main sources  of dynamism  in the  world
market,  MERCOSUR  can provide an additional  stimulus to this trade.
Table 9:  Intra-Industry trade - 1992
Country  Developed  Developing  USA  UE  LAIA  Brazil  Argentina
Economies  Economies
Brazil  0.58  0.42  0.64  .0.55  0.50  - 0.73
Argentina  0.27  0.63  0.30  0.23  0.70  0.56
Source:  Commodity Trade  Statistic.
Elaboration:  FGV/IBRE/CEEG.
With  respect  to trade  in agricultural  commodities,  besides  the  data  already  mentioned  and  discussed
previously,  it  is  worthwhile  noticing  the  so-called  strategic  trade.  By  strategic  trade  we  mean  a  few
products  which  are new markets  for all trade partners  in MERCOSUR.  In the  particular  case  of trade
relations between Argentina and Brazil,  there are processed food products imported  from Argentina which
pushed domestic industries  in Brazil towards more efficient production and processing.  On the other hand,
Argentina is  a growing market for poultry  and hog related products for Brazil.
Finally  the results achieved  by MERCOSUR,  even if more expressive  in terms  of trade  flows,  are not
restricted to this area.  There has been increasingly movements of Brazilian and Argentine firms establishing
subsidiaries  in the member-countries.
Future Perspectives  for MERCOSUR
Problems associated with the stabilization process still surround  any analysis about the future perspectives
for  MERCOSUR.  Anyhow,  it must  be  noted  that  the  member-countries  succeeded  to  implement  an
"imperfect custom union" during a period when the divergence on macroeconomic  variables have produced
great disparities on the trade balances.
Facing,  however,  a  worsening  of the  macroeconomic  conditions  that  can  really  jeopardize  the  anti-
inflationary  plans,  MERCOSUR  doesn't  represent  and  effective  discipline  framework for  its  member-
countries.  The  biggest  member-country  does  not  display  enough  stable  conditions  to  be  viewed  as  a
reference parameter.  Moreover,  MERCOSUR's market is relatively  small to Brazil to make it to renounce
taking  some  measures  that  negatively  affect  the  integration  process  in  the  presence  of  threats  to  the
stabilization plan 5.
* Soon after the common external  tariff was implemented,  the accumulation of trade deficits  initiated on
November  1994 couple with the Mexican crisis led the Brazilian authorities to claim for the introduction of new
exceptions  to the common external tariff and  also in relationship to the  free trade between MERCOSUR  member
countries.
162Therefore one must leave  aside que  question of stabilization just for a  moment to think  about the  future
perspectives  of MERCOSUR.  Two scenarios can be thought.  The first where the gains  from the process
of integration outweighs possible loses on Argentina and Brazil and, therefore,  not only the governments
but also the private sectors will be interested to push forward the negotiations  towards a  common market.
The other scenario is just the opposite.  Even if there are gains, they are relatively  small and move towards
a free trade agreement with the United States could be more attractive,  for example.
As is well known the actual effects  of an integration process depends  on a great variety of factors.  Besides
the true effects of integration must be analyzed on a dynamic perspective.
Even though,  as a first step,  in order to build up a reference  framework,  the questions pointed out above
can be approached  through  an exercise  of static  general  equilibrium.  This will  help  define  better  the
possible  outcomes  for MERCOSUR.
Some  Stylized  Facts About the Brazilian Economy
After World War II, import-substitution  industrialization was the chosen path for the development  of the
Brazilian and Argentine economies.  This led to the creation of an array of trade and domestic interventions
that has been in place until the late  eighties.  Besides,  both  countries shared  the same view  towards the
agricultural  sector: a domestic sector whose aim was to provide cheap food and raw materials for industry.
The outcomes  of these general policies were, however,  slightly different in the two countries.
A big wave of investments  associated  with the  import-substitution model occurred in both countries in the
late fifties. Nonetheless,  better results in terms of growth rate were achieved by the Brazilian economy.
Whereas the average annual  rate of growth of Brazil was 9.6%  (1956/60),  the Argentine's  rate was 3 %.
These differences were translated mainly into a greater growth and diversification  of the Brazilian industrial
sector compared  with the Argentine.
Some problems,  however,  were common to both economies  at that period. Overvaluation  of the exchange
rate,  quantitative  controls of imports and exports,  and high import tariffs  produced  and anti-export bias to
industrial  and agricultural products.  Moreover,  the inflationary  financing  of the import substitution model
exhausted  in the  beginning  of the  sixties  imposing  a  challenge  to the  continuation  of the  development
strategy.
Brazil's  answer  proved  to  be  efficient  in  terms  of  recovery  of  the  economic  growth.  The  military
government of 1964 introduced a series of monetary,  fiscal and financial reforms that helped to control the
inflationary process  and stimulated  economic  growth.  Moreover,  the government  implemented a  system
of mini-devaluations  of the exchange  rate in order to maintain a stable real exchange  rate and a generalized
scheme  of  credit  subsidies  and  fiscal  incentives  that  aimed  to  stimulate,  specially,  the  growth  of
manufactured  exports.
The  oil  crisis  of 1973/74, though  constraining  the  possibility of high rates  of growth,  did not  hamper
completely  the Brazilian  economic  growth.  Instead  of adjusting  to  the new  international  scenario,  the
Brazilian planners  used the high level of liquidity of international markets at that time to complete what was
understood as the last stage of the import substitution model:  the strengthening of a national capital goods
sector and the diversification of intermediate goods sector such as chemicals and steel products.
163It was only with the second oil shock of 1979 accompanied by a large increase  in international interest rates
and the foreign debt crisis that the need of an adjustment process became clear to the Brazilian government.
The Argentine's  economy,  in  contrast,  did not do  very well  during  the seventies.  Whereas  the  annual
average  of growth  of GDP  was  8.6%  during  this  period  in  Brazil,  the  same  rate  was  only  2.5%  in
Argentina.  Inflation rates, also, pointed  out a worse performance  of the Argentine economy compared  to
the Brazilian  (See Tables 10  and  11)
An attempt was made to solve the Argentine  crises during  1976/81 by renouncing the import substitution
model strategy.  Import liberalization,  however,  took place amid  high rates  of inflation,  a simultaneous
opening of the capital account balance  of payments and an overvalued peso.  The result was a sudden inflow
of speculative capital that only gave a temporary impression of stability. The peso (the Argentine currency)
collapsed  in  1981  and  a  series  of devaluations  pressed even more the  escalating  of the  inflation  rate.
(Argentina  1993).
During the eighties Argentina and Brazil shared again the same basic problems.  On the external front,  the
debt  crisis  of 1982 meant no longer access  to  private  international  capital markets  and pressure  to  the
creation  of  surpluses  in  the  balance  of trade.  On  the  domestic  front,  large  fiscal  imbalances  made
increasingly difficult the financing  of the public debt.  The outcomes were high rates  of inflation and low
rates of economic growth (see Tables  10 and  11).
Diverse attempts through stabilization plans were made during the eighties. Again both economies followed
the same path.  The Cruzado  Plan in Brazil  and the Austral  Plan launched  in the  mid-eighties were  the
major  government  initiatives  in both countries  during this  period 6. The  initial  success  on curbing  the
inflation rates was,  however,  followed by the reemerging  of inflationary  pressures.
Table  10:  Average  Rate of Growth of Inflation
Sources:  IBGE, IMF  and CEPAL
Certainly there are  soe  are some differences  about thne  experience of the eightiesbetween  Argentina and Brazil.
Brazil,  for instance,  was most successful  introducing trade surpluses through manufacture  exports.  Also
the indexation scheme  of all contracts in the Brazilian economy protected,  in some sense,  the production
and consumption decisonsumption  decisions  from the disruptive defects of the inflationary  process.
16 Both plans were based upon price  and wage freezes,  the launching  of a new currency  and a vague commitment
to tight monetary  and fiscal policies.
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Years  Brazil  Argentina
1970 a 1980  30.14  119.45
1980 a  1986  153.27  269.81
1986 a  1991  780.37  634.42
1991  a 1994  1720.04  12.83Table  11:  Gross Domestic Product - Brazil and Argentina
Source:  IBGE, IMF and CEPAL.
Nonetheless,  the general diagnosis  of the structural  imbalances on both countries  was basically  the same
in the late eighties. The import substitution model had exhausted its role as the engine of growth  and was
only producing  distorcive effects upon the economy.  There was also an urgent need to reform the role of
the State which had acted as a player shaping the market forces  during the import substitution strategy.
Import liberalization,  deregulation  of the markets,  fiscal reform,  privatization  of state-owned enterprises
have become the key elements  of the new development strategy.
The  design  of the  stabilization  plans  and  the degree  coverage  of the  structural  reforms  are,  however,
different in Brazil and Argentina.
Argentina's  stabilization plan,  which has until now managed to control the inflation rate, was  launched  on
April/1991.  The centerpiece  of the programme was the establishment of free convertibility  with a pegged
exchange  rate set  at one  dollar to  one  peso.  Moreover,  the  creation  of new  money  was  linked  to the
behavior of foreign reserves similar to a golden standard regime.  The commitment  of the government to
these new rules were put into legislation approved  by Congress.
Simultaneously  the  government  had began  to tackle  all the .structural reforms  associated  with the  new
development  strategy  already pointed out. The average  rate of inflation dropped from 2314% in  1990 to
4%  in  1994.  After years of stagnation,  the economy  experienced high rates  of growth.  Nonetheless,  the
current  account  deficit  reached  US$  10500  millions  in  1994.  This  latter  result,  linked  with  the
overvaluation  of the peso,  is undoubtedly the most fragile  element of the stabilization plan'7.
After an unsuccessful  attempt to control inflation  in  1990,  the Brazilian government  implemented  a new
programme in July  1994,  which has until  now maintained  the inflation rate at relatively  low levels18. The
confidence  on the  stabilization plan is not yet very  well rooted on the Brazilian society.  Fiscal  Reform,
17  The Mexican crisis has  worsened even more this problem  due to the higher risk now associated with Latin
American countries.  It has  become more difficult to disregard the building up of current  account deficits  in a
moment where the International  capital has diminished  its degree  of confidence  on Latin America  stabilization
plans.
18 The rate of inflation  is slightly increasing  since January,  but it is still under 2.5%  a month.
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Years  Average  rate of growth of real
GDP
Brazil  Argentina
1970/1980  8.63  2.52
1980/1990  1.48  -0.90
1990/1993  2.45  8.03considered  one  of  the  major  pre-conditions  to  sustain  macro-economic  stability,  is  still  on  debate.
Privatization goes at a much slower pace than previously announced by the government.  The Mexican and
Argentine experience,  however,  has obliged the government  to be more careful  about accumulating trade
deficits and thus the exchange  rate policy  is more flexible19.
Potentially the Brazilian economy can respond fairly well to the challenges  imposed by a higher degree  of
trade openness.  Since the beginning of the Tariff Reform of 1990,  there has been efforts by the productive
sector to increase its efficiency20. Nonetheless,  macroeconomic  stability  is still a mayor unknown on the
Brazilian scenario.
The stabilization plan in Argentina, albeit some problems,  displays  a better performance  given the clear
commitment of the government  with the structural  reforms and fiscal discipline.  However the high rates
of growth were mainly due to an increase  of service  sectors rather than productive  sectors.  Therefore,  the
Argentine economy  still faces the challenge,  specially on industrial  sectors,  to improve  its productivity.
The General Trade Analysis  Package
GTAP is a worldwide general  equilibrium model developed by Hertel and associates  at Purdue University.
The aggregation used for this paper consists often commodity  and eight regions21,  namely 2:
Regions:  E_U,  PAC,  BRA, ARG, MEX, NAM,  LAM,  ROW
Commodities:  NATRES,  MNFRES,  MNFCAP,  OTHMEQ,  ALLEGRN,  NONGRN,
LVSTCK,  FOODPR,  MILK,  SERVC.
In  addition  to  the  full  set  of accounting  relations  required  for  consistency,  the  model  also  includes
behavioral  and technological  restrictions  and  a  full  set of price equations.  The latter reflects  the  set of
output, input and trade taxes and subsidies  as well as transportation costs. Additionally,  different treatment
is given to primary factors  leading  to different factor market closures.
GTAP also generates welfare measures  that permit an accurate evaluation of welfare.  This is indeed a great
advantage since it allows the effects of the policy  changes to be directly connected to the ultimate objective
of trade liberalization,  which is national welfare and distribution,  thus avoiding the need to concentrate the
analysis on approximate measures  like trade creation23.
19 As  already pointed  out on Section two this policy is based upon exchange  bands.
20  One indicator is the issue of ISO certificates  given to Brazilian enterprises that reaches  an amount of 600
hundred  compared with 40 given to Argentine enterprises.
21  The model and the aggregation for this paper were kindly provided by Prof. Tom Hertel whom we deeply
thank.
22 Appendix 2 lists the country and commodity compositions  of the GTAP/MERCOSUR aggregates.
23 Brandio and Martin (p.322) note the following:  Rules of thumb based on estimates of trade creation such as
that suggested in the Economist (1992,  p.55),  '...for  countries previously separated by quite high trade barriers,
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are  differentiated  by  source  using  Armington  parameters  and  where  the  imported  goods  are  also
differentiated  from the domestic goods through another act of Armington parameters.  Value added is also
produced  through  a  CES  which,  in  turn,  is combined  (zero  substitution)  with  the  aggregate  input  to
generate output.
The  three  uses  of  regional  income  in  the  model  are:  private  household  expenditure,  government
expenditure  and savings.  The breakdown  of income among  the three  is  determined  by a Cobb-Douglas
utility; that is,  the shares of each of these destinations  of income  remains a  fixed proportion  of regional
income  in the model.  Once the share of government  is determined,  its allocation among commodities  is
again  determined by  a Cobb-Douglas  process.  From  there  on,  government  demand follows  a  similar
process  of the  producer's  input  demand  where  domestic  goods  and  imports  of different  sources  are
differentiated through a set of Armington parameters.  Value added is also produced through a CES  which,
in turn, is combined (zero substitution)  with the aggregate  input to generate  output.
Private household  demand  is  modeled using  a CDE  functional  form.  This  is  chosen because  it  can be
calibrated rather easily to existing income and price elasticity data and it displays several properties  of fully
flexible functional  forms.
Two types  of primary factors are considered.  Capital and labor are fully mobile and in consequence  they
have  the same  price in all sectors.  Land however,  which is  only  used in the  agricultural  and livestock
sectors,  is  not fully mobile.  This  is  captured  in the model using  a  CET function to  reflect  the costs  of
transformation  of land used in, say, grain production to livestock.
Another  aspect of the model is the global transportation sector.  Transportation services  are produced using
services  exported by each region.  Data on costs of export services in particular routes  is not available,  thus
the model  combines these services  into a single composite  international  transport good.  This is  achieved
using a Cobb-Douglas technology  and, in consequence, the share of each region in the provision of services
to the  global transportation  sector is constant.  The output of the global transportation  service is utilized,
in each route and for each commodity,  in fixed proportions.
Finally,  the  policy  instruments  in  the  model  are  output,  input,  primary  factors,  and  trade  taxes  and
subsidies (tariffs  and export taxes and subsidies).
Experiment and Results
The  experiment  consists  of  the  elimination  of  all  tariffs  between  Argentine  and  Brazil  and  of  the
implementation of a common external tariff (TEC) for the two  countries.  The TEC for 2006,  the last year
of  the  integration  process,  was  chosen.  The  experiment  thus  simulates  long  run  impacts  after  the
adjustments in factor and product markets are completed  and when MERCOSUR truly becomes  a common
market.  An additional  consideration  relevant for the interpretation  of the results  is  that the date base  of
GTAP contains the tariff structure that existed  in Brazil before  1990.  In consequence,  the results reflect
the gain in welfare  due to trade liberalization equals  about one  fifth of the  expansion of trade' cannot be  expected
to give  reliable results in a multilateral context.
167both,  the  unilateral  reform  made  by  President  Collor's  government  in  the  early  1990s,  and  the
MERCOSUR  reform.
The  tariff  structure  for  Argentina  and  Brazil  and  the  size  of the  tariff  change  for  each  region  and
commodity  of GETAP/MERCOSUR  are contained in Appendix  3.  Table  12 shows trade weighted average
tariffs. It is immediately  clear that tariff levels in Brazil were higher than in Argentina.  The two exceptions
are grains (ALLGRN)  and natural resource based (NATRES)  goods.  One additional  characteristic of the
Brazilian tariffs is their substantial variation  among regions  24,  as  seen in Table  A2,  Appendix  3.  Most
tariffs applied  to imports from Argentina were the highest practiced by Brazil.  Important exceptions are
ALLGRN,  NONGRN  AND  MILK.  For  Argentina,  on  the  contrary,  the  tariff  structure  is  more
homogeneous  and the bias against Brazil,  even in the few cases  where it exists,  is not large.
Table  12:  Ad-Valorem  Tariffs
Argentina  Brazil*
Commodities
Before  After  %  Before  After  %
MERCOSUR  MERCOSUR  Change  MERCOSUR  MERCOSUR  Change
NATRES  19.82  4.99  -74.82  1.27  4.99  292.91
MNFRES  28.86  13.49'  -53.26  33.46  13.49  -59.66
MNFCAP  25.45  11.29  -55.64  31.69  11.29  -54.37
OTHMEZ  18.58  13.93  25.03  44.69  13.93  -68.83
ALLGRN  18.12  5.52  69.54  5.70  5.52  -3.16
NONGRN  17.37  8.65  50.20  21.30  8.66  -59.39
LVSTCK  13.85  7.97  -42.45  23.54  7.97  -66.14
FOODPR  17.63  12.36  -29.89  43.86  12.36  -71.82
MILK  21.93  15.08  -31.24  36.19  15.08  -58.33
Source:  for tariffs  before  liberalization,  GTAP  database;  for  common  external  tariff,  Ministerio  de  Industria  o
Comercio.
Table  12 also shows that substantial  liberalization of regional trade with the  rest of the  world  will take
place.  Nevertheless,  the Brazilian tariff for NATRES  increases  relative to the current level and the tariff
for ALLFRN  is practically  unchanged.  The  average  tariff reduction  is  of the order  of 48 percent  for
Argentina and of the  order of 56 percent for Brazil if we disregard the large increase  in tariffs observed
for NATRES.
Selected  Results
Aggregate  Results.  MERCOSUR  is a small block with respect to the world economy.  In this experiment
the changes  in the world rice indices  (see Table  15)  are insignificant.  The largest (in absolute value)  one
is -0.11 percent for MNFCAP.  Most world prices increase,  as should be expected  from a tariff reduction.
However,  for MNFRES,  MNFCAP and OTHMEQ,  prices decrease.  This bears on characteristics of the
24  In  GTAP tariffs are not differentiated regionally.  The differences  appear because  of the composition  of trade
among the regions of the model.
168model  and of the liberalization process.  Imports increase  significantly in the liberalizing countries.  These
increases are larger for MNFRES, MNFCAP and OTHMEQ because  of the size of the reduction in tariffs
and because  they are good substitutes  for the more expensive domestic goods  in the production process.
The  easiness with  which  imported MNFRES,  MNFCAP  and  OTHMEQ  can substitute  domestic  goods
worldwide further contributes  to the expansion in exports from Argentina  and Brazil.
Another characteristic  of MERCOSUR is that the two largest partners  have fairly closed  economies'.  The
overall  impact for Argentina  and Brazil is accordingly  relatively  small.  For example:
the  increase  in  GDP  (volume)  was  0.69  percent  for  Brazil  and  practically  zero  for
Argentina;
the change in net primary factor income for Argentina and Brazil is respectively  144 and
0.44.  With constant  factor endowments,  this  is equal  to  increase  in the primary  factor
price index;
the change in aggregate  expenditures  in Argentina  and Brazil  is respectively 0.33  and  -
1.08;
the change in the value of GDP for the two countries was  1.10 and -0.43 respectively due
to  an increase  of 1.10 percent  in the GDP price  index for Argentina  and  a reduction  of
1.12 percent for Brazil.
Welfare gains associated with MERCOSUR are consistent with results normally found in CGE models.  The
equivalent variation for Argentina is US$  713 million (approximately  0.3 percent of GDP) and for Brazil
it is US$3,080 million (about 0.6 percent of current GDP), more than four times the gain to Argentina.  For
the world as a whole,  equivalent variation is US$6,055  million.  Thus,  about half of the world welfare  gain
accrues  to Brazil and about  12 percent accrues to Argentina.
For  comparison purposes,  we  note that  Goldin,  Knudsen  and  van der Mensbrugghe  (1993),  using  the
RUNS model, have  estimated gains from full world trade  liberalization of the order of 0.4 percent GDP
for Brazil and  1.3 percent  for Latin America  (excluding  Brazil and Mexico).  The  welfare  gains for the
world as a whole  was found to be US$ 450 billion (1992 dollars).  Using the RUNS model,  Brandio and
Martin (1993)  have found gains of the order of 0.3 and 1.2 percent respectively  for Brazil and (other) Latin
America from partial liberalization  of agricultural  trade in OECD  and in developing countries.  The gain
for the world as a whole was  estimated at US$  139 billion (1992 dollars).
Trade and Production. The next two tables display the changes in exports  (Table  13)  and  imports (Table
14) for Brazil.  There  is a generalized  increase  in imports,  as a consequence  of the reduction in domestic
protection.  Similarly, Brazilian exports increase.  The increase is larger for Argentina because the complete
elimination of tariffs will give an incentive to  Argentinean households  and firms to purchase more from
the MERCOSUR  partners. However,  exports  to the other regions of the model  increase too. This takes
25 Trade (average  of imports plus exports) have been of the order of 7.5 percent from Argentina and 8 percent of
GDP for Brazil.
169place because cheaper imports lead to substitution of domestic goods  not only  in consumption,  but also  in
production.
Some  aspects to note on Table  13 are,
exports of manufactured  goods to Argentina (MNFRES,  MNFCAP and  OTHMEQ)  will
more than double when all the adjustments from MERCOSUR  are completed.  Most other
exports  to Argentina will increase  significantly,  particularly  those  of NATRES,  foodpr
AND milk;
exports of MNFCAP and OTHMEQ  will increase by about 30 percent for all the regions
of the model, except,  as noted above, to Argentina.  This  is quite significant  in view of the
fact that the tariff changes in countries  outside MERCOSUR  is zero in the experiment;  and
the increase in agricultural  exports for regions of the model other than Argentina  is small.
While  the overall  increase  in exports  of MNFCAP  and  OTHMEQ  is  larger  than  50
percent,  for most agricultural goods it is less than 20 percent.  The noticeable  exception is
MILK.
We now turn to imports. As expected,  there are large increases  in imports  from Argentina.  This reflects
the increase in the competitive position of that country vis a vis the rest of the world and the lower  prices
facing Brazilian households  and firms.
Aspects to be noted on Table  14 are the following:
except  for ALLGRN,  NONGRN  and SERVIC  all  imports  from Argentina  more  than
double and in some cases the increase  is almost six folds  (MNFCAP);
for MNFRES  and MNFCAP the increase  in imports from Argentina,  the European Union
and the Pacific  Countries,  will  be  at the expenses  of imports  from  other  regions in  the
American  continent.  For example,  imports from NAM of MNFCAP  will be reduced  by
73 percent;
imports of manufacture  goods will generally  increase more than  imports  of agricultural-
based goods;
imports of FOODPR increase by about 60 percent.  The bulk of this increase comes  from
Argentina.  Trade  is diverted from  all  other regions  of the model,  except the  European
Union;  and
the  European  Union  and the  Pacific  Countries  will  increase  their  share  on Brazilian
imports.  This  reflects  the relatively high tariff levels that existed  on imports from these
countries.  An exception to this is NONGRN  imports from North America which will more
than double,  while imports from Argentina and the Pacific Countries  increase very  little.
170Table  13:  Percentage  Changes in the Volume of Brazilian  Exports
Commodities  European  Pacific  Brazil  Mexico  North  Latin  Rest of the  Total
Union  Countries  America  America  World
NATRES  6.53  6.37  116.58  6.39  6.40  6.31  6.43  10.61
MNFRES  11.29  11.15  132.94  10.83  10.97  10.43  11.3  18.56
MNFCAP  36.28  35.57  251.34  36.41  36.01  34.71  36.17  80.25
OTHMEQ  31.88  31.69  186.95  30.88  31.53  29.97  31.93  51.67
ALLGRN  6.37  6.18  46.62  6.60  5.87  6.41  6.09  8.77
NONGRN  5.76  5.73  67.19  5.76  5.52  5.59  5.75  6.86
LVSTCK  6.61  6.50  54.27  6.32  6.42  6.61  6.52  9.49
FOODPR  8.90  9.28  97.13  8.99  8.85  8.99  9.21  10.60
MILK  6.78  7.18  104.94  7.02  6.55  6.89  6.75  61.45
SERVIC  5.74  5.69  6.63  5.45  5.49  5.56  5.69  5.73
Table  14:  Percentage  Changes in the Volume of Brazilian Imports
Commodities  European  Pacific  Brazil  Mexico  North  Latin  Rest of the  Total
Union  Countries  America  America  World
NATRES  117.00  -14.50  135.62  -14.58  -9.85  1.62  -14.86  -8.61
MNFRES  77.95  104.77  421.79  -3.96  -28.34  -17.47  -13.57  57.90
MNFCAP  106.59  221.08  571.24  -5.45  -72.50  17.71  9.01  58.80
OTHMEQ  41.11  59.93  271.74  24.53  13.91  37.16  36.36  39.76
ALLGRN  73.55  74.65  6.33  -28.53  -11.26  40.20  3.80  2.14
NONGRN  56.25  14.15  2.59  -17.08  181.57  -1.63  -1.66  29.34
LVSTCK  41.13  -7.63  103.61  -52.87  -39.40  48.21  44.84  40.50
FOODPR  50.13  -16.74  202.15  -54.85  -45.50  -54.38  -52.05  59.81
MILK  28.45  29.07  135.25  -66.94  25.58  28.08  28.10  47.09
SERVIC  -2.47  -2.27  -4.68  -2.00  -1.89  -2.03  -2.11  -2.26
Source:  GTAP database.
Table  16 shows that production will fall in most sectors.  This  is  an expected outcome of the reduction  in
tariffs. Three exceptions  are NATRES,  for which the TEC  is actually higher than what was practiced by
Brazil,  SERVIC and LVSTCK (where the increment is small).  Total demand for livestock decreases  (-0.31
percent) relatively  less than the other commodities  in the model,  despite the large  reduction in the tariff
rate. The  growth in exports is relatively small too,  but nevertheless  sufficient to  induce an expansion  of
the output of the sector. In Argentina,  on the contrary,  the output in the livestock sector diminishes  slightly,
0.27 percent.
171Prices. The MERCOSUR experiment indicates a sharp increase in the domestic merchandise  terms of trade
for Brazil. The price indices of merchandise  exports and imports decrease respectively 2.7 percent and  14.7
percent,  giving rise to an increase in the domestic terms of trade of the order of 12 percent26. The changes
in the domestic prices for the ten commodities  of the model  are shown in Table  15.
Table  15:  Percentage Changes in World and Brazil's Domestic Prices
of Exported and Imported Goods
Commodities  World Price  Export Prices  Import  Prices
NATRES  0.03  -1.09  3.30
MNFRES  -0.01  -1.94  -19.03
MNFCAP  -0.11  -4.73  -21.77
OTHMEQ  -0.03  -5.08  -21.80
ALLGRN  0.01  -1.45  -2.71
NONGRN  0.01  -1.50  -13.15
LVSTCK  0.01  -1.42  -14.00
FOODPR  0.02  -1.90  -29.58
MILK  0.01  -1.50  -18.04
SERVIC  0.02  -1.36  0.06
AVERAGE  -2.69  -14.66
The change in imported price is consistent  with the reductions in tariffs  that take place in this  experiment.
The reduction  in export prices  is caused by the use of cheaper imports in the production of domestic (and
exported)  goods and the fixed level of the current account.
Primary Factors  We have already  noted the  impact on total primary  factor  income.  Primary  factor use
increases in NATRES,  LVSTCK and SERVIC (this is  shown in Table  16).  Consistent with the change  in
output, labor and capital use in OTHMEQ will be significantly reduced.  Land use increases  in the livestock
sector and decreases  in ALLGRN  and NONGRN.
26 The corresponding numbers for Argentina are as follows: the change in merchandise  export prices is zero and
the change in merchandise import prices is -11.4 percent,  giving rise to an improvement  in the terms of trade of
11.4  percent.
172Table  16:  Brazil: Percentage  Changes in Production and In Primary Factor Use
Commodities  Production  Land  Labor  Capital
NATRES  3.58  0.00  3.62  3.56
MNFRES  -0.13  0.00  -0.09  -0.16
MNFCAP  -1.60  0.00  -1.56  -1.63
OTHMEQ  -6.29  0.00  -6.27  -6.33
ALLGRN  -0.61  -0.24  -0.83  -0.86
NONGRN  -0.63  -0.25  -0.84  -0.87
LVSTCK  0.15  0.38  0.07  0.03
FOODPR  -0.60  0.00  -0.56  -0.62
MILK  -1.67  0.00  -1.64  -1.70
SERVIC  0.43  0.00  0.47  0.39
There are two types of primary factors in the model:  labor and capital,  which  are fully mobile;  and land
which is sector specific.  Accordingly the price changes  for the first two are  the same in all sectors, namely
-0.37 and -0.31 percent respectively.  In the case of land,  the changes  in price differ slightly across sectors
-1.421  in ALLGRN,  -1.425  in NONGRN  and  -0.810 in LIVSTCK.  This pattern  is  consistent with  the
observed changes in land use noted in Table  16.  Additionally,  because land  is not used outside agriculture,
the drop in its price is larger than the drop in labor and capital prices which can also be employed  in the
expanding non agricultural sectors.
Summary and Conclusions
At present,  MERCOSUR  is an  imperfect  customs union  with  a number  of exceptions  to  the  common
external  tariff in place.  They  must be  eliminated  before  a true  customs  union starts  to  exist  in  South
America.  Substantial progress  however,  has been made  in the integration process.  The most important
indication  of that  is  the  complete  elimination  of the  tariffs  for  the member  countries.  This  paper has
analyzed  the  impacts  of the  tariff  reforms  that  will  be  in effect  when  the  MERCOSUR  agreement  is
completed,  in year 2006.
By the year 2006  a substantial liberalization of trade between the regional  block and the rest of the world
will take place. Nevertheless,  the results show clearly that MERCOSUR  is a small regional block both from
the world's point of view and from the point of view of the largest partners  (Argentina  and Brazil).  The
economy wide effects in both countries are relatively  small.  But there are very significant changes  in trade,
both in exports and imports.
Brazil will expand significantly  her exports of manufactured  and capital  goods,  of mechanical  equipment
and of dairy products. The expansion of the latter will be targeted essentially  to Argentina, but surprisingly,
exports  of the  others for the rest of the world will  grow  around 30 percent.  This  is an indication that,
despite the high level  of protection given by past policies,  some  industrial sectors  in Brazil are in a position
to compete  effectively  in world markets.
Brazilian imports of most goods  will  increase.  For natural resources,  of which Brazil  is  a net exporter,
however  there is a decline  in imports. This is due to the fact that the common  external tariff is higher than
173what is currently practiced in Brazil.  There will be little increase in imports of grains.  Additionally,  imports
of this  commodity  from  Canada  and  the USA  will decrease  and substantial  increases  from  the  Pacific
Countries and from the European Union will take place. This is likely to be a consequence  of lesser wheat
imports from Canada  and the  USA  and  more  imports of rice  from  the Pacific  Countries  Surprisingly
additional imports from Argentina  are not large.
The process of integration is a complex one and success or failure depends  on a number of other variables,
some of which are non economical.  Nevertheless,  the results shown here indicate that despite the relatively
small impacts,  the gains for some sectors may be sizeable.  Moreover,  in a model like this not all important
elements are properly considered.  In particular,  the positive  impact on foreign investment that  is likely to
occur in consequence  of a more transparent and stable trade policy  is not fully accounted for.
Additionally,  the model does not take into  account economies of scale that are  likely to  exist in several
segments of the industrial sectors  in Argentina  and Brazil and  of the fact that the two economies have  a
significant degree of complementarity.  This is not entirely  apparent in the results  of this paper because  of
the high level of aggregation of the analysis. Nevertheless,  the fact that Brazilian exports of manufactured
goods to  Argentina  increase  substantially  and the  same  is  true for  the  Argentine  exports  to  Brazil  of
livestock, processed  food products and dairy products.
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174APPENDIX  1
Structure of negotiations of MERCOSUR
The treaty  of Asunci6n  has created two intergovernmental  groups  to pursue the negotiations  related  do
MERCOSUR  they are:
* The market Common Counsel which has the power to deliberate  about the measures  that have
to be implemented  towards the creation of a common market.
*The Market Common Group which has the task to implement measures,  agreeded by the Market
Common  Counsel,  propose  and  organize  the  steps  towards  the  common  market.  This  Group




*Monetary and Fiscal Policies related to Trade
*Land Transportation
*Maritime Transportation
*Industry and Technological Policies
*Agriculture policy
*Energy Policy
*Coordination of Macroeconomic  Policies
*Labor Relations,  Employment and Social  Security
On December  1994,  three more inter-governmental  groups were created.
*Trade Commission responsible for the supervision of the implementation of the common external
tariff and problems related to it as custom valuation and rules of origin.
*Parliamentary  Joint Commission
*Consultant  Forum  for  Social  and  Economic  Matters  composed  by  private  and  governments
members.
175APPENDIX 2
Regions and Commodity of the MERCUSOR Aggregation  of GTAP
Regions:
E_U  European Union
PAC:  Pacific  Countries.  Australia,  New  Zealand,  Japan,  Republic  of Korea,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,




NAM:  North America,  Canada and United States  of America.
LAM:  Latin America.  Rest of Latin America.
ROW:  Rest of the World. Sub  Saharan Africa, Middle  East and North  Africa, Economies  in transition,
South Asia and Others.
Commodities:
NATRFS:  Natural Resources,  Forestry,  Fisheries, Coal,  Oil, Gas,  Other  Minerals and Lumber.
MNFRES:  Manufactured  Goods  Intensive in Natural Resources.  Textiles, Wearing Apparel,  Leather,  Pulp
Paper, Petroleum, Coal, Nonmetallic Minerals,  Primary Ferrous Metals,  Nonferrous  Metals and Fabricated
Metal Products.
MNFCAP:  Manufactured  and  Capital Goods.  Chemical  rubbers  and plastics,  Transport  Industries  and
Other manufacturing.
OTHMEQ:  Other Mechanical  Equipment,  Machinery  and Equipment.
ALLGRN:  Grains,  Paddy Rice,  Wheat, Maize  and Cotton.
NONGRN:  Other Agricultural Products.  Horticulture,  Fruits,  Vegetables,  Soybean  and Soybean produce
and Others.
LVSTCK:  Livestock.  Wool,  Meat Products,  Live  animals and Other Livestock  Products.
176FOODPR:  Processed Food Products.  Processed  Rice,  Coffee, Sugar,  Cocoa,  Other  Beverages,  Tobacco
and Other Processed Food.
MILK:  Dairy Products.
SERVIC:  Services,  Electricity,  Water,  Construction,  Trade an Transport,  Other Private Services,  Other
Government  Services; Ownership  of Dwellings.
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Base Year Tariffs for Argentina and Brazil
Table A-3. 1:  Tariffs Practiced by Argentina
Commodities  European  Pacific  Brazil  Mexico  North  Latin  Rest of the  Mean
Union  Countries  _______  America  America  World  Tariff
NATRES  1.27  118  1.24  1.12  1.18  1.16  1.19  1.20
MNFRES  1.28  1.33  1.26  1.31  1.31  1.29  1.29  1.29
MNFCAP  1.21  1.27  1.31  1.15  1.25  1.28  1.17  1.25
OTHMEQ  1.11  1.20  1.23  1.21  1.23  1.22  1.22  1.19
ALLGRN  1.20  1.13  1.13  1.12  1.18  1.16  1.20  1.18
NONGRN  1.18  1.14  1.18  1.15  1.14  1.19  1.19  1.17
LVSTCK  1.15  1.17  1.13  1.17  1.16  1.15  1.13  1.14
FOODPR  1.20  1.20  1.18  1.23  1.13  1.17  1.22  1.18
MILK  1.21  1.21  1.21  1.00  1.15  1.24  1.24  1.22
Source:  GTAP database.
Table  A-3 .2:  Tariffs  Practiced by Brazil
Commodities  European  Pacific  Brazil  Mexico  North  Latin  Rest of the  Mean
Union  Countries  America  America  World  Tariff
NATRES  1.19  1.01  1.15  1.00  1.01  1.04  1.00  1.01
MNFRES  1.43  1.47  1.51  1.29  1.23  1.26  1.27  1.33
MNFCAP  1.48  1.57  1.53  1.32  1.11  1.36  1.36  1.32
OTHIMEQ  1.46  1.49  1.50  1.43  1.40  1.45  1.45  1.45
ALLGRN  1.22  1.23  1.05  1.00  1.05  1.17  1.09  1.06
NONGR.N  1.31  1.22  1.10  1.13  1.49  1.18  1.18  1.21
LVSTCK  1.26  1.15  1.27  1.00  1.05  1.27  1.26  1.24
FOODPR  1.58  1.40  1.63  1.23  1.28  1.24  1.25  1.44
MILK  1.36  1.36  1.36  1.00  1.35  1.36  1.36  1.36
Source:  GTAP database.
178Table A-3.3:  Tariff Changes  in Argentina*
Commodities  European  Pacific  Brazil  Mexico  North  Latin  Rest of the
Union  Countries  America  America  World
NATRES  -17.61  -11.21  -19.23  -6.44  -11.07  -9.81  -11.70
MNFRES  -11.53  -14.56  -20.77  -13.06  -13.67  -12.11  -11.75
MNFCAP  -7.69  -12.35  -23.68  -2.85  -11.29  -13.34  -5.28
OTHMEQ  2.73  -4.88  -18.57  -5.61  -7.53  -6.69  -6.69
ALLGRN  -11.78  -6.81  -11.64  -5.78  -10.62  -8.75  -12.21
NONAGRN  -8.08  -4.98  -15.40  -5.85  -5.03  -8.85  -8.85
LVSTCK  -5.97  -8.03  -11.54  -7.56  -6.79  -5.87  -4.55
FOODPR  -6.28  -6.65  -14.90  -8.78  -0.60  -4.17  -8.25
MILK  -4.90  -4.90  -17.36  15.08  0.17  -7.42  -7.42
*Percentage  Change  ln  (1 +  tariff rate)
Table  A-3.4:  Tariff Changes in Brazil*
Commodities  European  Pacific  Argentina  Mexico  North  Latin  Rest of the
Union  Countries_____  America  America  World
NATRES  -11.58  4.46  -13.29  4.55  3.56  1.34  4.59
MNFRES  -20.74  -22.58  -33.73  -11.88  -7.37  -9.58  -10.32
MNFCAP  -24.71  -29.23  -34.45  -15.81  0.26  -18.35  -17.53
OTHIMEQ  -22.02  -23.71  -33.38  -20.16  -18.88  -21.48  -21.48
ALLGRN  -13.85  -13.93  -4.50  5.52  0.47  -9.51  -3.09
NONGR.N  -16.89  -10.71  -9.25  -3.93  -27.23  -7.60  -7.60
LVSTCK  -14.18  -6.21  -21.03  7.97  2.47  -15.00  -14.57
FOODPR  -28.73  -19.58  -38.48  -8.84  -12.26  -9.05  -9.98
MILK  -15.57  -15.62  -26.63  15.08  -15.02  -15.45  15.45
* Percentage  Change  ln (1 + tariff rate)
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Table A-4.2:  MERCOSUR  - Real  Exchange  Rate Index
March/ 1991  = 100
Years  Months  R$/US$  P$IUS$
1991  Mar.  100.00  100.00  100.00
Apr.  107.01  103.39  96.62
May  110.66  110.91  100.23
June  111.41  110.19  98.91
Jul.  112.59  109.13  96.97
Aug.  111.25  105.89  97.88
Sep.  113.51  111.57  88.29
Oct.  129.30  124.97  96.86
Nov.  130.21  126.02  96.78
Dec.  136.70  131.47  96.18
1992  Jan.  139.39  132.94  95.03
Feb.  141.92  130.54  91.94
Mar.  146.02  134.51  92.33
Apr.  148.33  135.35  91.25
May  143.07  131.38  91.45
June  143.53  130.48  90.91
July  145.18  132.10  90.99
Aug.  147.31  134.25  91.13
Sep.  148.23  135.51  91.69
Oct.  149.02  136.67  91.71
Nov.  152.14  139.06  91.40
Dec.  150.12  138.24  92.09
1993  Jan.  147.23  138.13  93.85
Feb.  150.67  142.71  94.53
Mar.  149.89  142.87"95.31
Apr.  150.85  145.13  96.20
May  156.38  151.60  97.57
June  155.30  153.74  98.68
July  155.70  154.56  99.22
Aug.  153.78  156.00  101.46
Sep.  153.54  157.20  102.38
Oct.  156.73  150.73  101.88
Nov.  157.22  161.17  102.51
Dec.  155.61  162.26  104.27
1994  Jan.  153.56  162.41  105.83
Feb.  153.87  162.63  105.63
Mar.  150.02  158.83  105.88
Apr.  151.93  162.57  107.00
May  155.18  186.44  107.26
June  152.05  183.73  107.68
July  155.71  189.35  108.78
Aug.  147.59  181.72  109.58
Sep.  141.25  153.60  108.74
Oct.  135.11  145.63  107.76
Nov.  131.12  148.82  111.98
Dec.  130.51  148.31  114.02
180Table  A-4.3:  Brazil: Exports  to Argentina, by Main Groups
Categories  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
In US$ Millions
Food products  75.6  50.8  31.1  48.4  120.7  255.1
Agricultural!  Raw Materials  16.8  24.4  11.5  9.2  20.3  24.5
Fuels  23.2  38.1  1.6  7.6  8.1  20.2
Ores  and Metals  96.5  102.7  148.3  120.9  134.6  155.1
Manufactured  Goods  399.6  538.4  372.3  456.9  1,190.5  2,814.2
611.8  754.7  568.6  645.1  1,475.5  3,089.7
Percent  of Total Trade
Food products  12.3  6.7  5.5  7.5  8.2  8.3
Agricultural/  Raw Materials  2.8  3.2  2.0  1.4  1.4  0.8
Fuels  3.8  5.0  0.3  1.2  0.5  0.7
Ores and Metals  15.8  13.6  26.1  18.7  9.1  5.1
Manufactured  Goods  65.3  71.3  65.5  70.8  80.7  85.2
Total Exports  100  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:  CEPAL
Brazil:  Total Exports, by Main Groups
Categories  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
__________________  ________  In US$ Millions  _________  ____
Food products  8470.2  9919.7  9372  8396.4  7881.3  9206.8
Agricultural! Raw  Materials  924.5  1129.5  1167.7  1051.1  1047.2  1165.5
Fuels  952.6  897.6  853.1  653.2  437  576.7
Ores and Metals  2888.5  3824.6  4190.8  4297.3  4552.2  4300.7
Manufactured  Goods  12995  1771.2  18393.6  16285.1  17345.3  20833.9
Total  of Exports  26225.6  33760  34293.9  31411.6  31621.8  36206.8
_____________  Percent of Total Trade_______
Food products  32.3  29.4  27.31  27.7  24.9  25.4
Agricultural! Raw Materials  3.5  3.3  3.4  3.3  3.3  3.2
Fuels  3.6  2.7  2.5  2.2  1.4  1.6
Ores and Metals  10.3  11.3  12.2j  13.7  14.4  11.9
Manufactured  Goods  49.5  52.5  53.6j  51.5  54.9  57.0
Total Exports  100  100.0  100.0j  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:  CEPAL
181Table A-4.3:  Argentina:  Exports to Brazil, by Main Groups  (continuacion)
Categories  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
In  US$ Millions
Food products  272.8  275.2  575.2  792.4  822.9  846.7
Agricultural!  Raw Materials  8.0  17.4  12.3  15.4  10.5  21.6
Fuels  0.1  4.1  19.3  5.8  29.8  122.9
Ores and Metals  15.6  12.2  24.5  21.3  13.4  9.2
Manufactured  Goods  242.7  298.9  492.6  587.3  611.5  871.0.2
Total of Exports  539.4  607.9  1,124.4  1,422.7  1,488.5  1,671.4
Percent of Total Trade
Food products  50.6  45.3  51.2  55.7  55.3  50.7
Agricultural!  Raw Materials  1.5  2.9  1.1  1.1  0.7  1.3
Fuels  0.0  0.7  1.7  0.4  2.0  7.3
Ores and Metals  2.9  2.0  2.2  1.5  0.9  0.6
Manufactured  Goods  45.0  49.2  43.8  41.3  41.1  40.1
Total  Exports  100  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source: CEPAL
Argentina: Total  Exports, by Main Groups
Categories  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
__________________________In  US$ Millions  _____
Food products  3,883.5  5,447.5  5,259.2  6,948.5  7,191.2  7,484.2
Agricultural!  Raw Materials  225.1  432.8  333.97  486.9  408.4  296.1
Fuels  97.4  157.0  333.5  965.4  768.4  1,086.3
Ores and Metals  153.45  221.16  246.48  302.1  203.42  142.9
Manufactured Goods  1,996.2  2,871.4  3,382.2  3,616.4  3,399.5  3,241.6
Total  of Exports  6,380.2  9,134.8  9,565.4  12,351.5  11,974.9  12,234.9
____________  Percent of Total Trade______
Food  products  61.1  59.6  55.0  58.3  60.1  61.0
Agricultural! Raw  Materials  3.5  4.7  3.5  3.9  3.4  2.4
Fuels  1.5  1.7  3.5  8.0  6.4  8.9
Ores and Metals  2.43  2.4  2.6  2.4  1.7  1.2
Manufactured  Goods  31.4  31.4  35.4  29.3  28.4  26.5
Source:  CEPAL
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